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INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION IN THE
LITIGATION OF AERIAL APPLICATION CLAIMS:





A IRCRAFT HAVE been used in agriculture since shortly after
World War I The use of aircraft for aerial applications of
pesticides did not become popular, however, until after World
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War II. By 1975, there were approximately 3,500 applicators in
the United States employing 4,700 professional pilots. Those appli-
cators flew 2 million hours and treated more than 200 million
acres at a cost of 375 million dollars to farmers The increase in
the use of aircraft in agriculture resulted primarily from the in-
creased number of trained pilots and the availability of surplus
aircraft following World War II, coupled with the development
of modem, more effective pesticides.!
Boom times in the aerial application and pesticide industry have
created the mixed blessing of governmental regulation. The indus-
try has become the subject of comprehensive regulatory schemes
on both the state and federal levels. The complexity of the schemes
is illustrated by the cost of compliance. One expert has estimated
that manufacturers can expect to spend ten to fifteen million dollars
and from five to ten years in development and testing costs just
to register a product for marketing." Once on the market, a pesti-
cide is always subject to "recall," a reality illustrated by the
Environmental Protection Agency's recent decision to suspend the
use of 2, 4, 5-T and Silvex. The aerial applicators themselves
have also been subject to increasing regulation in recent years.
In addition to satisfying numerous licensing requirements, appli-
cators have found it necessary to comply with comprehensive
reporting and record keeping regulations. Prohibitions on the use
of certain pesticides have necessarily hurt the industry. In a few
instances, local governmental bodies literally have put some appli-
cators out of business. Voters in Mendocino County, California
recently voted for a ban on aerial applications of phenoxy herbi-
cides.' In nearby Trinidad County, California, the Board of Super-
visors has just enacted two bans: one on the use of herbicides con-
taining dioxin and one on aerial applications.'
2 Bus. WEEK, Mar. 15, 1976, at 58.
3Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 833, 837 (1971).
4 Warren, Controlling Drift in Herbicides, WORLD OF AGRICULTURAL Av.,
March, 1976, at 30.
5 EPA Emergency Suspension Order, Feb. 28, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 15,874
(1979).
"WORM OF AGRICULTURAL Av., August, 1979, at 30.
7 Id.
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CLAIMS AGAINST AERIAL APPLICATORS: THEORIES OF LIABILITY
A. Common Law
The most serious risk inherent in aerial applications is the move-
ment of pesticides from target areas to non-target areas. This is
commonly called "drift." Drift is a function of various factors:
(1) the chemical nature of the pesticide; (2) the method of
application; (3) wind direction; (4) stability of the air; (5)
temperature and humidity; and (6) the carrier. Certain chemicals
create more of a drift hazard than others. The techniques em-
ployed by the applicator are critical when the chemicals involved
are phenoxy herbicides and dusts."
A common phenoxy herbicide, 2, 4-D, can be used to illus-
trate the hazards of drift. Used to control broadleaf weeds in
crops such as wheat, barley, and rice, the chemical is deadly to
crops such as cotton and tomatoes. Aerial applications of 2, 4-D
products are common in the Western States and areas of the South.
When applied in liquid form, the drift hazard of 2, 4-D is two-
fold: spray droplets may be blown from the target field to non-
target areas immediately after application ("spray drift"). The
product may also volatize, during application or days after appli-
cation, and be blown in a vapor form to non-target areas ("vapor
drift"). A spray droplet five microns in diameter released at an
altitude of ten feet in a three mile-per-hour wind will travel
three miles before touching ground.' The danger of drift is not
necessarily eliminated by restricting applications to calm days.
When the air is still, a "lapse" or an "inversion" may occur, caus-
ing spray particles or vapors to remain suspended above target
areas. The slightest air movement will move the pesticide off
target. In one study on the effects of stable air on aerial applica-
tions, herbicide symptoms were noted fifty miles from the point
of application.
As suggested above, control of pesticide "drift" is extremely
difficult. In fact, many commentators have suggested that precise
control in application is impossible. It would be fair to say that
8Dusts are used very little in herbicide applications because of the problem
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aerial application is an imperfect art at best and that the risk of
inadvertent drift is one that cannot be eliminated with the tech-
nology currently available."
A majority of the states nationwide have held that the liability
of an aerial application must be based on a finding of negligence.
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear what must be proved in order
to show such negligence."2 Examples of specific negligent acts cited
by various courts include applications in "high winds" conditions,"
failing to notify plaintiff of the applications," making applications
when defendant knew or should have known that the wind would
carry the pesticide over and upon plaintiff's crops,"5 and failing
to shut off sprayers while flying over plaintiff's land.' In other
cases, the courts appear willing to make a finding of negligence
on little more than evidence of damage. Thus, in Schultz v. Har-
less," the court held the defendant liable because he knew or
should have known that his application of 2, 4-D might cause
damage. Similarly, in Kennedy v. Clayton," the court found the
defendant negligent for failing to investigate the possibility that
the 2, 4-D pesticide applied might drift.
If the various courts seem unable to agree on a "standard of
care" for the aerial applicator, their shortcomings can perhaps be
explained by the risk-benefit analysis which lies at the heart of
11 Comment, Crop Dusting, Two Theories of Liability?, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 476,
478 (1968). See also WORLD OF AGRICULTURAL Av., September, 1979, at 23, in
which it was reported that:
[T]he National Pesticide Use Observation Program, a program of
the Environmental Protection Agency, concluded after extensive
tests that complete drift control cannot be achieved with any
device, additive, or system commercially available. Even under
ideal weather and application conditions it was found that an
estimated 10 percent to 35 percent of the chemical applied drifted
beyond the target site.
'"In Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961), the court noted,
after reviewing the decisions on aerial applicator liability, that it was sometimes
difficult to detect what theories the courts were following in imposing liability.
362 P.2d at 314.
"Gragg v. Allen, 481 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ dism'd
w.o.j.).
"Brown v. Sioux City, 242 Iowa 1196, 49 N.W.2d 853 (1953).
"S Parks v. Atwood Crop Dusters, 118 Cal. App. 2d 368, 257 P.2d 653 (1953).
" Hammond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson, 199 Ark. 846, 136 S.W.2d 484 (1940).
17271 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1954, no writ).
1216 Ark. 851, 227 S.W.2d 934 (1950).
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our tort system. Negligence has been defined as conduct which
involves an unreasonably great risk of causing damage." Since all
human activity carries some possibility of harm to others, the
"reasonableness" of one's conduct is determined "by balancing the
risk, in the light of the social value of the interest threatened, and
the probability and extent of the harm, against the value of the
interest which the actor is seeking to protect, and the expedience
of the course pursued."' For this reason, argues Prosser, it is sel-
dom possible to reduce negligence to any definite rules. Negligence
is relative to the need and the occasion."
Decisions such as Schultz v. Harless strongly suggest that certain
courts are merely paying lip service to the negligence doctrine while
in fact shifting the risk of loss to the applicator and imposing a rule
of strict liability. Indeed, under the standards of care imposed by
some courts, it is difficult to conceive of any aerial applicator
escaping liability for damage resulting from his applications.
Only four states in the United States have expressly adopted the
doctrine of strict liability in connection with aerial application
losses. The first to do so was Louisiana. In the case of Gotreaux
v. Gary," the court allowed judgment for the plaintiff where plain-
tiff established that his crop was destroyed by a 2, 4-D herbicide
applied by defendant on a rice field 3-1/4 miles south of plain-
tiff's fields. Although the court recognized that rice was one of
Louisiana's most important crops and that its proper cultivation
necessitated the use of herbicides, it held that plaintiff could not
be deprived of the privilege of raising his crops because of de-
fendant's spraying operations. Said the court:
We are unwilling to follow any rule which rejects the doctrine
of absolute liability in cases of this nature and prefer to base our
holding on the doctrine that negligence or fault, in these instances,
is not a requisite to liability, irrespective of the fact that the
activities resulting in damages are conducted with assumed reason-
able care and in accordance with modern and accepted methods.'
Four years after the Gotreaux decision, the Supreme Court of
isW. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 145 (4th ed. 1971).
20Id. at 149.
21 Id.
22232 La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957).
2'94 So. 2d at 295.
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Oklahoma rendered its opinion in Young v. Darter.' In that case,
plaintiff sought recovery for damage to cotton allegedly caused by
the drift of a 2, 4-D herbicide applied by defendant to a nearby
pasture. In affirming a judgment for plaintiff, the court said:
When one, in an operation lawful and proper in itself, but cog-
nizant of existing conditions and with knowledge that injury
may result to another, does an act with the result flowing there-
from that damage is done to the other as the direct and proximate
consequence of the act, the one who does the act and causes the
injury should be required to compensate the other for the damage
done.'
The facts of the case, reasoned the court, brought it within the
rule of Rylands v. Fletcher." Defendant's use of 2, 4-D was at his
own peril. He was responsible for its drifting and thereby trespassing
on plaintiff's land where it damaged plaintiff's cotton. Any pre-
cautions defendant may have taken to prevent the injuries to plain-
tiff's cotton could not serve to extinguish his liability. "The ques-
tion," said the court, "is not whether defendant acted with due
care and caution, but whether his acts occasioned the damage.""
The third state to adopt a strict liability approach to aerial
application losses was Oregon. In the case of Loe v. Lenhardt,"
the court ruled that the use of pesticides was an "ultrahazardous
activity" which warranted the application of the trespass principles
set forth in section 165 of the Restatement of Torts:" "The ele-
ment of fault, if it can be called that, lies in the deliberate choice
24363 P.2d 829 (Okla. 1961).
2Id. at 832.
26 If a person brings or accumulates on his land anything which, if
it should escape, may cause damage to his neighbor, he does so
at his peril. If it does escape and cause damage, he is responsible,
however careful he may have been and whatever precautions he
may have taken to prevent the damage.
3 H.L. Cas. 330, 334 (1868) (concurring opinion).
21 363 P.2d at 834.
28227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961).
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 165 (1965) provides as follows:
One who recklessly or negligently, or as a result of an abnormally
dangerous activity, enters land in the possession of another or
causes a thing or third person so to enter is subject to liability to
the possessor if, but only if, his presence or the presence of the
thing or the third person upon the land causes harm to the land,
to the possessor, or to a thing or third person in whose security
the possessor has a legally protected interest.
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by the defendant to inflict a high degree of risk upon his neighbor
even though utmost care is observed in so doing."' Under this
theory, liability is imposed upon the applicator by virtue of his
voluntary taking of the risk of damage to his neighbor's crops.
The most recent state to impose strict liability on an aerial
applicator is Washington. In Langan v. Valicopters,' the court
relied upon sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts in finding the defendant applicator strictly liable for
damage resulting from the applicator's operations.' Imposition
of strict liability was justified, the court reasoned, because the
aerial application of pesticides is an "abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity."3 Although the court recognized that the control of insects,
weeds, and other pests was socially valuable, it pointed out that
the high degree of risk inherent in aerial applications could not
be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care. Under such
circumstances, said the court, the losses caused by pesticides
should be borne by the applicator."
B. State and Federal Legislation
The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972 es-
tablishes a federal regulatory scheme for the manufacture and
30 362 P.2d at 317.
3188 Wash. 2d 855, 567 P.2d 218 (1977).
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) provides as follows:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is sub-
ject to liability for harm to the persons, land or chattels of another
resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost
care to prevent such harm; (2) such strict liability is limited to the
kind of harm, the risk of which makes the activity abnormally
dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977) provides as follows:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the
following factors are to be considered: (a) whether the activity
involves a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others; (b) whether the gravity of the harm which
may result from it is likely to be great; (c) whether the risk cannot
be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) whether the
activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) whether the activity
is inappropriate to the place where it is carried on; and (f) the
value of the activity to the community.
3 567 P.2d at 222-23.
34 Id.
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use of pesticides. The federal statute covers everything from
production to application. '
Under 7 U.S.C. § 136a, all pesticides must be registered with
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency before
they may be sold or distributed. Registration requires submission
to the Environmental Protection Agency of a statement of all
claims made for the pesticide, as well as a complete copy of the
product's label and a description of the product's use. An applicant
may also be required to submit a full description of all tests made
on the product and the results thereof. The Administrator is
authorized to register a pesticide only upon his determination that
the pesticide is properly labeled and that it will not cause un-
reasonable adverse effects on the environment. Use of an unregis-
tered pesticide is prohibited.
Seven U.S.C. § 136b(a) (1) is of special significance to the
aerial applicator. It empowers the Administrator to prescribe
standards for the certification of applicators of pesticides. The
impact of this section is modified, however, by a provision which
permits a state to establish certification procedures, subject to the
approval of the Administrator. Most of the major agricultural states
have chosen this option. At the same time, most of the states
choosing this option have patterned their certification procedures
on the federal model. Typically, the state regulatory schemes re-
quire applicators to undergo a training program followed by a
written proficiency examination. Many of the state programs also
require pesticide dealers to participate in certification programs.
Both the state and federal regulatory schemes are designed to in-
sure that applicators demonstrate a knowledge of labeling, safety
factors, environmental impacts, pesticides, equipment to be used,
application techniques, and state and federal laws and regulations.
Aerial applicators must also comply with the requirements of
Part 137 of the Federal Aviation Regulations."6 Under these regu-
lations, no person may conduct agricultural aircraft operations
without an aircraft operator's certificate. An applicant for a Com-
mercial Agricultural Aircraft Operator's Certificate must have
available the services of at least one person who holds a current
35 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516,
86 Stat. 793 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 135-136y (1976)).
- 14 C.F.R. § 137 (1979).
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Commercial or Airline Transport Pilot Certificate. The applicant
must also have at least one certified and airworthy aircraft,
equipped for agricultural operation. Finally, the applicant must
show that he has satisfactory knowledge and skill regarding agri-
cultural aircraft operations. Part 137.19 requires a test of knowl-
edge of pesticides and a flight test on agricultural operations
maneuvers. Once certificated, the agricultural operator must fol-
low precise operating rules and satisfy numerous record keeping
requirements.
As might be expected, the various federal and state statutes and
regulations have had an impact on the aerial applicators' civil
liability. Although proof of compliance with government regula-
tions will not necessarily relieve the applicator of liability for
damage caused by pesticide applications,"7 the provisions of the
state and federal pesticide acts have been held to establish mini-
mum standards of care.' Compliance with the legislative standard
may be prima facie evidence of due care.' In Arkansas, a viola-
tion of the state pesticide act is, by statute, prima facie evidence
of negligence on the part of the applicator.' In Mississippi, the
pesticide act limits plaintiff's recovery for certain pesticide dam-
age to a single theory-negligence." In Virginia, violation of the
state pesticide act constitutes negligence as a matter of law, pre-
cluding the need for establishing the common law elements of
negligence.'
INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION:
SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF LOSS TO THE MANUFACTURER
When sued for losses sustained to non-target crops, the aerial
"See Muncey v. Magnolia Chem. Co., 437 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. 1968).
11 Muncey v. Magnolia Chem. Co., 437 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. 1968) (violation
of the federal act is negligence per se); McClanahan v. California Spray-Chem.
Corp., 75 S.E.2d 712 (Va. 1953) (violation of state and federal statutes is negli-
gence as a matter of law); Gonzalez v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 239 F.
Supp. 567 (E.D.S.C. 1965) (violation of federal labeling provisions is negligence
per se).
"' Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976).
40 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 77-258(e)(4) (Supp. 1979).
41 Miss. CODE ANN. § 69-21-15 (1972) provides that "in all actions for dam-
ages to crops caused by application of hormone-type herbicides by aircraft ...
the Plaintiff shall allege and prove that the damage complained of is the result
of negligence ......
'McClanahan v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 75 S.E.2d 712 (Va. 1953).
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applicator is frequently limited to a single defense: due care under
the circumstances. It is suggested by the authors that opportunities
abound for obtaining contribution or even full indemnity from
pesticide manufacturers. In this section, the basic rules of con-
tribution and indemnity shall be examined, and the application
of this rule to litigation involving aerial applicators will be dis-
cussed.
A. General Rules of Indemnity and Contribution
Indemnity is the right of a party held liable to another to shift
the entire liability to a third party. The concept is designed to re-
lieve the "morally innocent" tortfeasor from the burden of a loss
and to impose the burden instead on the party whose wrongful
conduct actually caused the loss. As Prosser has pointed out, it
is extremely difficult to formulate a general rule as to when in-
demnity will be allowed and when it will not:
It has been said that it is permitted only where the indemnitor
has a duty of his own to the indemnitee; that it is based on a
great difference in gravity of the fault of the tortfeasors; or that it
rests upon a disproportion or difference in character of the duties
owed by the two to the injured plaintiff. Probably none of these
is a complete answer and, as is so often the case in the law of
torts, no one explanation can be found which will cover all of the
cases. Indemnity is a shifting of responsibility from the shoulders
of one person to another, and the duty to indemnify will be recog-
nized in cases where community opinion would consider that, in
justice, the responsibility should rest upon one rather than the
other.'
It is generally agreed that the right to indemnity exists in favor
of one who is liable by imputation of law because of his special
relationship with the actual wrongdoer, as where an employer is
held vicariously liable for the acts of his employee. Indemnity is
not strictly limited, however, to those who are free from fault.
Thus, the courts have recognized that a right of indemnity exists
against a manufacturer in favor of the retailer of a product lack-
ing an adequate warning where the retailer was held liable for
his negligence in failing to provide an adequate warning." Such
43W. PROSSER, supra note 19, at 281.
"Jacobs v. Technical Chem. Co., 472 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972).
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a result is justified on the grounds that the retailer's liability stems
from his "passive" or "secondary" role as a distributor of a defec-
tive product furnished by the "active" or "primary" wrongdoer, the
manufacturer.
Contribution is a right, developed in equity, which permits a
tortfeasor who pays more than his fair share of a judgment to
recover from fellow tortfeasors their pro rata share of the judg-
ment. Common liability is the essence of contribution. If the party
from whom contribution is sought is not liable to the person
harmed, there is no basis for contribution.'
A majority of states now permits contribution among joint tort-
feasors, and generally, this right is governed by statute." Although
there are variations among the statutes, they are similar in several
important respects. Most provide that there is no contribution in
favor of persons who commit willful or intentional torts."' Most
also provide that the contribution defendant must be a tortfeasor,
and originally liable to the plaintiff. ' Finally, most of the contribu-
tion statutes provide that each tortfeasor is required ultimately to
pay his pro rata share of the damages.' In a few jurisdictions,
the distribution of the liability is in proportion to each tortfeasor's
comparative fault.' Generally, however, the pro rata share is de-
termined by dividing the plaintiff's damages by the number of
tortfeasors responsible for the loss. 1
B. Indemnity Under the Uniform Commercial Code
Pesticides are "goods" within the meaning of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC) and subject to the provisions of Article Two
(Sales). The Code defines a "buyer" as "a person who buys or
contracts to buy goods."" A "seller" is defined as a "person who
5W. PROSSER, supra note 19, at 305-10.
46 1 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW 566-67. Twenty states permit contribution
by statute. Ten of these states have adopted variations of the Uniform Con-
tribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act. Six states have allowed contribution by
judicial decision. Id.
47 W. PROSSER, supra note 19, at 305-10.
48 Id.
4Id.
1 Id.; see also Burk Motors, Inc. v. International Harvester Co., 466 S.W.2d
907, reh. denied, 466 S.W.2d 943 (Ark. 1971).
51 W. PROSSER, supra note 19, at 305-10.
51 U.C.C. S 2-103 (a).
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sells or contracts to sell goods."' An aerial applicator who buys
and applies pesticides is, at times a buyer and at times a seller
within the meaning of the UCC. In his dealings with the aerial
applicator, the chemical manufacturer will generally be a seller.
When a sale of goods takes place, the UCC provides that the
seller impliedly warrants that his goods are of "merchantable"
quality.' If the seller knows the particular purpose for which the
goods sold are to be used, the seller also impliedly warrants that
his goods are "fit" for the buyer's "particular purpose."'" The
implied warranties which arise under the UCC are in addition to
express warranties made by the seller." When a seller breaches
any of his warranties, the buyer may avail himself of the remedies
delineated in the Code, which include incidental and consequential
damages."'
The rights of the pesticide applicator under the UCC were
spelled out with exceptional clarity in an opinion rendered by
the United States District Court of Missouri. The case of Chemco
Industrial Applicators Co. v. E.I. -DuPont de Nemours & Co."
involved an applicator who contracted with the Grady-Gould
Water Shed Improvement District (District) to eradicate vege-
tation along thirty-five miles of drainage ditches owned by the
District. To fulfill its obligations under said contract, the appli-
cator, Chemco, used approximately twelve thousand pounds
of Hyvar-x, a product manufactured by DuPont. DuPont had,
through its sales agent, represented that Hyvar-x would effect a
ninety to one-hundred percent kill on willow and brush in drain-
age ditches. Based upon this representation, Chemco had guaran-
teed the District an eighty-five percent kill. Subsequent to the
applications, the District discovered that the actual kill was from
twenty to seventy-five percent. The District brought suit against
Chemco and its surety in state court and obtained judgment in
the amount of $31,000. Chemco and its surety then sued DuPont
for indemnity. In its, answer to Chemco's complaint, DuPont
53 U.C.C. § 2-103(d).
- U.C.C. S 2-314.
- U.C.C. § 2-315.
56 U.C.C. S 2-313.
57 U.C.C. § 2-711, 5 2-715.
5"366 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
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alleged that Chemco had improperly applied the product."
Sitting without a jury, the court held that the representations
made by DuPont's sales representative that Hyvar-x would effect
a ninety to one-hundred percent kill were express warranties under
section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code." The court also
held that DuPont had impliedly warranted, under sections 2-314
and 2-315, that Hyvar-x was "merchantable" and "reasonably fit
for the purpose" of eradicating brush from the drainage ditches.
According to the court, all of these warranties were breached and
Chemco was thus entitled to consequential damages under section
2-715 of the UCC. By way of relief, the court ruled that DuPont
was liable for the $31,000 judgment recovered in state court by
the District and discharged by Chemco's surety. The court further
ordered DuPont to pay for the attorney's fees incurred by Chemco
in defending the District's suit. The court found no evidence to
support DuPont's argument that the applications had not been
made in accordance with DuPont's labeled instructions."
In opinions rendered prior and subsequent to the Chemco deci-
sion, numerous other courts have recognized the indemnity rights
of buyers under the UCC. In Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co.," the
court recognized that the presence of a 2, 4-D compound in a
DDT spray would amount to a breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability. In Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc.," the court held
that a manufacturer's failure to warn users of the dangerous nature
of its product would make the product defective and that any sub-
sequent sale of that product would constitute a breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability and/or fitness.
Of particular importance to the aerial applicator faced with
claims is the rule generally accepted by the courts that the pro-
motional literature distributed by manufacturers and the oral
representations made by their sales agents may constitute express
warranties within the meaning of section 2-313 of the Uniform
Commercial Code." The UCC states that an express warranty
59 Id. at 281.
60id. at 283.
61 Id. at 285.
6242 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041, 1048 (1954).
63 549 P.2d 1383 (Kan. 1976).
64 Chemco Indus. Applicators Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 366
F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
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may be an affirmation of fact, a promise, a description of goods
or a sample, if the parties agreed that the goods shall conform
thereto.' Oftentimes, manufacturers promote products, especially
herbicides, by providing locally prominent applicators with free
samples or by enlisting such applicators in test programs. When
an applicator purchases and uses large quantities of herbicide,
based on the test samples provided by the manufacturer, and is
subsequently the subject of a lawsuit for damages caused by the
product, the applicator should have a viable action against the
manufacturer for breach of express warranty upon proof that the
product sold was not the same as the product tested.
C. Indemnity and Contribution Under Strict Liability and Negli-
gence Theories
An aerial applicator faced with claims arising out of the use
of a pesticide which does not perform as expected may claim
indemnity or contribution from the pesticide manufacturer on
either a negligence or strict liability theory. Special attention should
be given to the possibility that the pesticide label contains inade-
quate warnings or is otherwise deficient. Under the Federal En-
vironmental Pesticide Control Act, a pesticide is "misbranded"
if it does not contain certain warnings or cautionary statements
adequate to protect health and the environment." A product is
obviously misbranded if it contains impurities,"7 and the manu-
facturer may be held liable for damages resulting therefrom. Like-
wise, a manufacturer who markets a product with dangerous
propensities has a duty to adequately warn the user of the dangers."
Failure to provide proper warnings on pesticide labels has, on at
least one occasion, been held to be negligence as a matter of law."
Several courts have held that misbranded products are defective
under the doctrine of strict liability." In any event, it would appear
that if an applicator can show that plaintiff's damages were
"U.C.C. S 2-313.
"Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (codified at 7 U.S.C. S 136(q) (1976)).
67 Rose v. Buffalo Air Serv., 104 N.W.2d 431 (Neb. 1960).
Is McClanahan v. California Spray-Chem. Co., 75 S.E.2d 712 (Va. 1953).
69 Id.
"Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 549 P.2d 1383 (Kan. 1976); Brooks v. Dietz,
545 P.2d 1104 (Kan. 1976).
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caused by inadequate warnings or misleading labeling, the appli-
cator is entitled to indemnity from the manufacturer. 1
At least one reported decision suggests that a manufacturer can
be held strictly liable in tort for its failure to adequately test a
product before placing it on the market. In Chapman Chemical
Co. v. Taylor,"1 plaintiff filed suit against an aerial applicator for
damages sustained by plaintiff when 2, 4-D dust applied by the
applicator drifted onto plaintiff's cotton. The applicator, in turn,
filed a third-party complaint against the manufacturer of the dust.
At trial, both the applicator and the manufacturer testified that
they were unaware of the drift potential of 2, 4-D powder. On
the basis of this testimony, the appellate court sustained a not
guilty verdict for the applicator. The court refused, however, to
reverse a finding of liability against the manufacturer. The court's
decision was based on testimony that the manufacturer had made
no tests to determine the floating quality of the dust and that it
was this characteristic which made the product extra hazardous.
The court reasoned that the manufacturer was strictly liable for
its failure to test the product."'
It should be remembered that the theories which will support
an action for indemnity or contribution may overlap. For example,
an "unmerchantable" product may also be "defective." Thus, the
facts necessary to prove an action for indemnity under a warranty
will probably also support a claim for indemnity under a strict
liability theory.
Tortfeasors may be entitled to contribution from one another
even though their tortious acts were committed at different times
and in different places, as long as their conduct combined to cause
the plaintiff's injury. Thus, in Yanick v. Pennsylvania Railroad,"
a case in which plaintiff was injured when a train plowed
through a bumping block on entering the station, the court held
71 See Jacobs v. Technical Chem. Co., 472 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972),
a failure to warn action by the buyer of a can of freon against the packager
and seller for injuries he sustained when the can exploded. The Texas Court of
Civil Appeals held that the dealer was entitled to indemnity from the packager
because the dealer carefully stored the product and its character was not changed,
while in the dealer's possession. 472 S.W.2d at 200.
72 222 S.W.2d 820 (Ark. 1949).
73 Id. at 827.
7 192 F. Supp. 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
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that the railroad, which was negligent in the operation of the
train, could maintain a cross-claim in contribution against the
manufacturer of a coach equipped with defective brakes. Simi-
larly, in Delta Engineering Corp. v. Scott,'6 a negligent crane
operator was said to have a right of contribution against the
manufacturer of a defective rope in connection with injuries
sustained by plaintiff when a rigging made from the rope failed.
Contribution is, of course, a two-edged sword. The manufac-
turer of a defective product can maintain an action in contribu-
tion against a user whose negligence is a concurrent, proximate
cause of another's loss. A case in point is Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gon-
zales,'" in which a drug manufacturer was found liable to a patient
in strict liability for failure to provide adequate information on
the use of its medicine. The evidence also showed that the physician
who administered the drug in question used amounts well over the
recommended dosage and that he further employed other, im-
proper, medical procedures. In approving an award in contribu-
tion in favor of the manufacturer and against the physician, the
court noted that the law already gave negligent manufacturers
contribution rights against other negligent third parties. The court
saw no reason to deprive the manufacturer of its contribution
rights simply because the judgment against the manufacturer was
based on a strict liability theory."
CONCLUSION
An aerial applicator faced with claims resulting from use of a
misbranded or otherwise defective product has a sound basis in
law for recovering against the manufacturer of that product in
either indemnity or contribution. If the applicator's "fault" is im-
puted by law, he has an excellent chance to obtain full indemnity
from the manufacturer. If the applicator has been "actively"
negligent, as where his actual carelessness results in damage to
non-target vegetation or livestock, his action against the manu-
facturer will be limited to one for contribution. In either situa-
14322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963).
76 548 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978).
17 548 S.W.2d at 428.
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tion, since claims in aerial application mishaps can easily run
into hundreds of thousands of dollars, the attorney defending an
applicator against such claims must thoroughly investigate his
indemnity and contribution possibilities.

